Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution social choice functions: An impossibility theorem

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90125-4zbMath0495.90006OpenAlexW2038091837MaRDI QIDQ1169915

John A. Ferejohn, Richard D. McKelvey

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90125-4

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesimpossibility theoremvon Neumann-Morgenstern solutionimplementability of social choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Consistent Voting Systems
• A Welfare Function Using "Relative Intensity" of Preference

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