Single-peaked orders on a tree
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Publication:1169916
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90020-8zbMath0495.90007OpenAlexW1983618218MaRDI QIDQ1169916
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90020-8
transitivityexistence of a majority winnersets of single-peaked linear orders on a treestrict majority rule
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