Strategic equilibria and decisive set structures for social choice mechanisms

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90030-0zbMath0496.90006OpenAlexW2091688993MaRDI QIDQ1170105

Edward W. Packel, Donald G. Saari

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/401.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium conditionsultrafiltersstrategic votingcollections of decisive setsprefilters filterssocial choice mechanismsstrategy selecting functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The structure of neutral monotonic social functions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Stability of Aggregation Procedures, Ultrafilters, and Simple Games
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Consistent Voting Systems

This page was built for publication: Strategic equilibria and decisive set structures for social choice mechanisms