Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(83)90024-1zbMath0499.90003OpenAlexW1528775297MaRDI QIDQ1171972

Manimay Sen

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(83)90024-1

zbMATH Keywords

implementabilityimplementation of social choice rulesdictotorialpartial implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium ⋮ Weakly implementable social choice rules

Cites Work

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• Voting with Proportional Veto Power
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• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Consistent Voting Systems
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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