Bayes's two arguments for the rule of conditioning
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Publication:1172890
DOI10.1214/aos/1176345974zbMath0502.62002OpenAlexW2089817792MaRDI QIDQ1172890
Publication date: 1982
Published in: The Annals of Statistics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176345974
Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)
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