Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions

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Publication:1173773

DOI10.1007/BF01719767zbMath0741.90100OpenAlexW1983688774MaRDI QIDQ1173773

Yukihiko Funaki, Theo S. H. Driessen

Publication date: 25 June 1992

Published in: OR Spektrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01719767




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