Efficient allocation with continuous quantities
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Publication:1174591
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90142-QzbMath0742.90028OpenAlexW2117779765MaRDI QIDQ1174591
Publication date: 25 June 1992
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90142-q
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Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance ⋮ A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism ⋮ Mechanism design for land acquisition ⋮ On the relationship between absolute prudence and absolute risk aversion ⋮ Trade of a common value good ⋮ Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade. ⋮ Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms ⋮ A dominant strategy double auction ⋮ Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality ⋮ Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade ⋮ Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders ⋮ The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap ⋮ On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
Cites Work
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- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
- Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
- Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
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