Majority tournaments: Sincere and sophisticated voting decisions under amendment procedure

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(91)90036-QzbMath0736.90003OpenAlexW2075595846MaRDI QIDQ1175774

K. Brooks Reid

Publication date: 25 June 1992

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(91)90036-q

zbMATH Keywords

tournamentsdecision treekingssincere votingamendment proceduresophisticated votingBanks pointsdivision treemajority voting proceduresvoting agenda

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

The relationship between two algorithms for decisions via sophisticated majority voting with an agenda

Cites Work

• The relationship between two algorithms for decisions via sophisticated majority voting with an agenda
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Choosing from a tournament
• The Voting Problem
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

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