Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
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Publication:1175961
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90179-OzbMath0741.90097OpenAlexW1965194288MaRDI QIDQ1175961
Kaushik Basu, Joergen W. Weibull
Publication date: 25 June 1992
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90179-o
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