The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval

DOI10.1007/BF00056369zbMath0792.90094MaRDI QIDQ1176025

Joseph E. jun. Harrington

Publication date: 25 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

risk preferencesbargainingunanimous approval

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (9)

Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic? ⋮ Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework ⋮ The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority ⋮ Legislative bargaining with teams ⋮ Altruism, spite and competition in bargaining games ⋮ Legislative bargaining and coalition formation ⋮ Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem ⋮ Uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the stochastic model of bargaining ⋮ Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining

Cites Work

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• A non-cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon
• Non-cooperative bargaining of \(N \geq 3\) players
• The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority
• Risk aversion in \(n\)-person bargaining
• Similarity and decision-making under risk (Is there a utility theory resolution to the Allais paradox?)
• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• The Bargaining Problem
• Stability in Voting
• A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes
• Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem

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