Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
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Publication:1176435
DOI10.1007/BF00183045zbMath0735.90001OpenAlexW2134628753WikidataQ55885671 ScholiaQ55885671MaRDI QIDQ1176435
James B. Orlin, John J. III Bartholdi
Publication date: 25 June 1992
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00183045
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