Recognizing majority-rule equilibrium in spatial voting games

DOI10.1007/BF00177657zbMath0744.90016MaRDI QIDQ1178172

Craig A. Tovey, John J. III Bartholdi, Lakshmi S. Narasimhan

Publication date: 26 June 1992

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

majority ruleNP-completespatial voting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Abstract computational complexity for mathematical programming problems (90C60) Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14) Spatial models in sociology (91D25)

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