Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable

DOI10.1007/BF00177660zbMath0747.90012OpenAlexW2011608094MaRDI QIDQ1178175

Diego Moreno, Mark Walker

Publication date: 26 June 1992

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00177660

zbMATH Keywords

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theoremnonmanipulable voting schemesreasonable preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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