An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90103-BzbMath0744.90115OpenAlexW2040689219MaRDI QIDQ1178808

David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 26 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90103-b

zbMATH Keywords

folk theoremlimit of \(\varepsilon\)-equilibria of discounted gamespunishment strategyrepeated games with imperfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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