A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90108-GzbMath0746.90007OpenAlexW1978714920MaRDI QIDQ1178815

Ryo-Ichi Nagahisa

Publication date: 26 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90108-g

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto principleNash equilibriaaxiomatizationlocal independencesocial choice ruleArrow-Debreu pure exchange economyfinite set of consumersfinite set of private goodsNash implementabilitynon-discriminationWalrasian resource allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

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Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills ⋮ A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies ⋮ Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem ⋮ Dividing bads under additive utilities ⋮ The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium. ⋮ Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market ⋮ Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Walrasian social orderings in exchange economies ⋮ Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set ⋮ Characterizations of the public and private ownership solutions ⋮ Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies

Cites Work

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