The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90112-HzbMath0739.90009OpenAlexW1976265827MaRDI QIDQ1178819

Hans Wiesmeth, Shlomo Weber

Publication date: 26 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90112-h

zbMATH Keywords

corepublic goodfinite number of agentscost share equilibriavaluation equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (7)

Equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium with participation prices and the core ⋮ Core equivalence with congested public goods ⋮ On the Edgeworth conjecture for production economies with public goods: a contract-based approach ⋮ Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition ⋮ The overprovision anomaly of private public food supply ⋮ OLIGOPOLY AND COST SHARING IN ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC GOODS ⋮ Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations

Cites Work

• Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach
• The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy
• On the theory of cost sharing
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy

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