Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90113-IzbMath0742.90007OpenAlexW1967816063MaRDI QIDQ1178820

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 26 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90113-i

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian collective choice problem with side paymentmutually correlated private information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (11)

Balanced Bayesian mechanisms ⋮ Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance ⋮ Joint production in teams ⋮ Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information ⋮ Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus ⋮ Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations ⋮ A note on Matsushima's regularity condition ⋮ Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions

Cites Work

• Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
• A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem
• Incentives in Teams
• Unnamed Item

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