Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
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Publication:1178820
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90113-IzbMath0742.90007OpenAlexW1967816063MaRDI QIDQ1178820
Publication date: 26 June 1992
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90113-i
Related Items (11)
Balanced Bayesian mechanisms ⋮ Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance ⋮ Joint production in teams ⋮ Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information ⋮ Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus ⋮ Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations ⋮ A note on Matsushima's regularity condition ⋮ Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
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