On the feasibility of maximal collusion

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90117-MzbMath0744.90117MaRDI QIDQ1178824

Paul S. Segerstrom

Publication date: 26 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibrium strategiesmaximal collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Demons and repentance
• Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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