Strong stability and evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of players

DOI10.1007/BF00168009zbMath0742.92014OpenAlexW2031023345MaRDI QIDQ1179451

A. T. Dash, Ross Cressman

Publication date: 26 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00168009

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategiesdynamic stabilitystrong stabilitytwo types of playersfrequency evolutionfrequency-dependent evolutionstatic ESS conditionstwo-species haploid system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Animal behavior (92D50)

Related Items (1)

Evolutionarily stable sets in symmetric extensive two-person games

Cites Work

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• Evolutionary games and two species population dynamics
• Selfregulation of behaviour in animal societies. III. Games between two populations with selfinteraction
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player

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