Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90057-BzbMath0743.90038OpenAlexW2023567000MaRDI QIDQ1181221

Thomas R. Palfrey, Sanjay Srivastava

Publication date: 27 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90057-b

zbMATH Keywords

pre-play communicationefficient trading mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation ⋮ On robust constitution design ⋮ Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism ⋮ Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction ⋮ Refining cheap-talk equilibria ⋮ A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information

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