Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90058-CzbMath0743.90037OpenAlexW2013541602MaRDI QIDQ1181222

Thomas A. Gresik

Publication date: 27 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90058-c

zbMATH Keywords

first-best solutionprivate valuationtrading mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction ⋮ Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade. ⋮ Bargaining with endogenous information ⋮ The role of commitment in bilateral trade ⋮ An ascending double auction ⋮ Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• On the difficulty of eliciting summary information
• Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
• Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
• Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs
• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

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