Continuity in auction design

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90064-BzbMath0747.90030MaRDI QIDQ1181229

Jacques Robert

Publication date: 27 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionlimited liabilityauctioneer's optimal expected gain

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (21)

The relevance of private information in mechanism design ⋮ Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly ⋮ A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity ⋮ Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents ⋮ Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ Equity and adverse selection with correlated costs ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types ⋮ Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure ⋮ Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes ⋮ Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design ⋮ Dynamic yardstick mechanisms ⋮ Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions ⋮ Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments ⋮ Full surplus extraction from samples ⋮ Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible ⋮ On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design ⋮ Pollution claim settlements under correlated information ⋮ Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction ⋮ Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage ⋮ Optimal contracts with contingent allocation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction

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