Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90067-EzbMath0751.90028OpenAlexW2079737264MaRDI QIDQ1181233

Tatsuyoshi Saijo

Publication date: 27 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90067-e

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalitypublic goodsindividual rationalitymechanism designincentive compatibilitypure exchange economies with private goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

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• The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely
• Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies