Correlated equilibria and evolutionary stability

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90048-9zbMath0747.90109OpenAlexW2053839551MaRDI QIDQ1181674

Martin W. Cripps

Publication date: 27 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90048-9

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriaevolutionary stable behaviorrational play

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (3)

Asymmetric games on networks: towards an Ising-model representation ⋮ The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria ⋮ Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations

Cites Work

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• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
• Non-cooperative two-person games in biology: A classification
• Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria

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