Necessary and sufficient conditions for balancedness in partitioning games

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(91)90068-3zbMath0744.90111OpenAlexW2056508258MaRDI QIDQ1181745

Thomas Quint

Publication date: 27 June 1992

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(91)90068-3

zbMATH Keywords

assignment gamepartitioning gamesconsecutive gameexistence of the core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Linear programming (90C05)

Related Items (10)

\(k\)-sided permutation games and multiprices of equilibrium ⋮ Restricted housewapping games ⋮ Stable Payment Schemes of Tu-Games With Multiple Crieria¹ ⋮ Subordinated hedonic games ⋮ Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices ⋮ A model of partnership formation ⋮ Bargaining sets and the core in partitioning games ⋮ PARTITIONING GAMES WITH RESTRICTED COOPERATION ⋮ The supplier-firm-buyer game and its \(m\)-sided generalization ⋮ Stable families of coalitions and normal hypergraphs

Cites Work

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• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
• Cores of partitioning games
• The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game
• Multidimensional stochastic matrices and patterns
• The assignment game. I: The core

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