A characterization of graphs that ensure the existence of stable matchings

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(91)90069-4zbMath0743.90039OpenAlexW2038401741MaRDI QIDQ1181746

Garth Isaak, Hernán G. Abeledo

Publication date: 27 June 1992

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(91)90069-4

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingstable marriagebipartite acceptability graph

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Mathematical economics (91B99)

Related Items (9)

Stable matchings and linear inequalities ⋮ Stable matchings and linear programming ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ Market structure and matching with contracts ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions ⋮ Unique stability in simple coalition formation games ⋮ Random stable matchings ⋮ Bipartite choices

Cites Work

• Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings
• An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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