Cooperative behavior in a competitive market

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(91)90001-8zbMath0743.90018OpenAlexW2085501963MaRDI QIDQ1181747

Leonard J. Mirman, Yair Tauman, Israel Zang

Publication date: 27 June 1992

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(91)90001-8

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecooperationcompetitive environmentmarket failurenon-emptiness of the coreAumann-Shapley imputations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Supportable cost functions for the multiproduct firm
• Optimal denominations for coins and currency
• Cores of convex games
• Internal Telephone Billing Rates—A Novel Application of Non-Atomic Game Theory
• An Application of the Aumann-Shapley Prices for Cost Allocation in Transportation Problems
• Existence of a Core When There Are Increasing Returns
• Nash Equilibrium and the Industrial Organization of Markets with Large Fixed Costs
• The Determination of Marginal Cost Prices under a Set of Axioms
• Demand Compatible Equitable Cost Sharing Prices
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Allocation of Shared Costs: A Set of Axioms Yielding A Unique Procedure
• The Core of an Economy with Production

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