On the existence of a stable convention and a generalized Stackelberg equilibrium

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(91)90006-DzbMath0748.90082OpenAlexW2092323822MaRDI QIDQ1181752

Fred W. Roush, Kim Hang Kim

Publication date: 27 June 1992

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(91)90006-d

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg equilibriumconventionally stable setsexistence of a stable convention

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Related Items (1)

The publications of Ki Hang Kim

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The conventionally stable sets in non-cooperative games with limited observations. I: Definitions and introductory arguments
• Conventions, social prejudices and discrimination: A festival game with merrymakers

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