The effect of knowledge on belief: Conditioning, specificity and the lottery paradox in default reasoning

DOI10.1016/0004-3702(91)90012-9zbMath0737.68074OpenAlexW2053726320MaRDI QIDQ1182167

S. Singh

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(91)90012-9

zbMATH Keywords

default reasoning systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (15)

Conditional logics of normality: A modal approach ⋮ On a rule-based interpretation of default conditionals ⋮ Adaptively applying modus ponens in conditional logics of normality ⋮ Inductive learning and defeasible inference ⋮ From statistical knowledge bases to degrees of belief ⋮ When is argumentation deductive? ⋮ Abnormality and randomness ⋮ Qualitative and quantitative conditions for the transitivity of perceived causation: theoretical and experimental results ⋮ Weak nonmonotonic probabilistic logics ⋮ REWARD VERSUS RISK IN UNCERTAIN INFERENCE: THEOREMS AND SIMULATIONS ⋮ Towards Context Sensitive Defeasible Rules ⋮ On decision-theoretic foundations for defaults ⋮ On first-order conditional logics ⋮ Is default logic a reinvention of inductive-statistical reasoning? ⋮ On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and \(n\)-person games

Cites Work

• Foundations of a functional approach to knowledge representation
• Semantical considerations on nonmonotonic logic
• An approach to default reasoning based on a first-order conditional logic: Revised report
• A logical framework for default reasoning
• A logic for default reasoning
• Non-monotonic logic. I
• All I know: A study in autoepistemic logic
• Nozick's Acceptance Rule and the Lottery Paradox
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