The repeated public goods game: a solution using tit-for-tat and the Lindahl point

DOI10.1007/BF00134048zbMath0749.90018MaRDI QIDQ1182914

Mark Irving Lichbach

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmacollective actiontit-for-tatLindahl pointrepeated public goods problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Sociality is a mechanism for collective action dilemma resolution ⋮ Seven rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons ⋮ Property and contract rights in autocracies and democracies

Cites Work

• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
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