Folk theorems for the observable implications of repeated games

DOI10.1007/BF00134049zbMath0749.90097OpenAlexW2076147417MaRDI QIDQ1182915

Eric Rasmusen

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00134049

zbMATH Keywords

supergamesinfinitely repeated gamesperfect equilibriumPrisoner's DilemmaFolk Theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Perfect Nash equilibria in finite repeated game and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the constituent game
• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Equilibrium and perfection in discounted supergames
• Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• The chain store paradox
• Finitely Repeated Games
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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