Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures
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Publication:1183694
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90068-SzbMath0745.90008OpenAlexW1973426159WikidataQ57486277 ScholiaQ57486277MaRDI QIDQ1183694
Sudipto Bhattacharya, Jacob Glazer, David E. M. Sappington
Publication date: 28 June 1992
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90068-s
Related Items (11)
Optimal assignment of principalship and residual distribution for cooperative R\&D ⋮ Balanced Bayesian mechanisms ⋮ Equilibrium and optimal sizes of a research joint venture in an oligopoly under uncertainty ⋮ Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances. ⋮ Exchanging good ideas. ⋮ Knowledge sharing in communities of practice: a game theoretic analysis ⋮ Bargained shares in joint ventures among asymmetric partners: Is the Matthew effect catalyzing? ⋮ Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts ⋮ Knowledge as a public good: Efficient sharing and incentives for development effort ⋮ Does trust matter for R\&D cooperation? A game-theoretic examination ⋮ The evolution of cooperation in patent races:Theory and experimental evidence
Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Market Structure and Innovation
- Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
- Racing with Uncertainty
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior
- Innovation and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
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