Finite automata equilibria with discounting

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90075-SzbMath0756.90105OpenAlexW2078626286MaRDI QIDQ1183702

Michele Piccione

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90075-s

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriafinite automatatwo-person infinitely repeated games with discounting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (12)

Bounded computational capacity equilibrium ⋮ Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game ⋮ Bottom-up design of strategic options as finite automata ⋮ Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts. ⋮ Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games ⋮ Computing equilibria in discounted dynamic games ⋮ Game Theory and Strategic Complexity ⋮ A strong anti-folk theorem ⋮ Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs ⋮ Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games ⋮ Limitations of learning in automata-based systems ⋮ Forecasting errors and bounded rationality: An example

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• A note on reactive equilibria in the discounted prisoner's dilemma and associated games
• The strength of a little perfection
• Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Discounted Dynamic Programming

This page was built for publication: Finite automata equilibria with discounting