A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness
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Publication:1183703
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90076-TzbMath0751.90100MaRDI QIDQ1183703
Publication date: 28 June 1992
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (43)
A weak \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem of generalized games with infinitely many players and pseudo-utilities ⋮ An exchange economy can have an empty \(\alpha\)-core ⋮ Existence and generic stability of cooperative equilibria for multi-leader-multi-follower games ⋮ The hybrid equilibria and core selection in exchange economies with externalities ⋮ Hadamard well-posedness of the \(\alpha\)-core ⋮ Coalitional equilibria in coalitional abstract economies with nonordered preferences ⋮ Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities ⋮ Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf's theorem: finite-coalition \(\alpha\)-cores and weak \(\alpha\)-cores ⋮ On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players ⋮ On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game ⋮ A social coalitional weak equilibrium existence theorem with a continuum of agents and applications ⋮ Non-emptiness of the fuzzy core in a finite production economy with infinite-dimensional commodity space ⋮ On the nonemptiness of the \(\alpha\)-core of discontinuous games: transferable and nontransferable utilities ⋮ Existence and continuity theorems of \(\alpha\)-core of multi-leader-follower games with set payoffs ⋮ The weak hybrid equilibria of an exchange economy with a continuum of agents and externalities ⋮ Generalization of the social coalitional equilibrium structure ⋮ On the structure of core solutions of discontinuous general cooperative games ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences ⋮ The \textit{ex ante} \(\alpha\)-core for normal form games with uncertainty ⋮ On the strong \(\beta\)-hybrid solution of an \(N\)-person game ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ The weak \(\alpha\)-core of exchange economies with a continuum of players and pseudo-utilities ⋮ Cooperative equilibria of finite games with incomplete information ⋮ Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores ⋮ Alpha cores of games with nonatomic asymmetric information ⋮ Some generalizations of Kajii's theorem to games with infinitely many players ⋮ Essential stability of \(\alpha \)-core ⋮ The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players ⋮ Essential stability of the alpha cores of finite games with incomplete information ⋮ Non-emptiness of the alpha-core: sufficient and necessary conditions ⋮ Existence of weakly cooperative equilibria for infinite-leader-infinite-follower games ⋮ A weak \(\alpha \)-core existence theorem of games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents ⋮ Existence and stability of the \(\alpha\)-core for fuzzy games ⋮ A coalitional extension of generalized fuzzy games ⋮ Competitive equilibria and benefit distributions of population production economies with external increasing returns ⋮ Coalitional instability of the distributive Lindahl equilibrium ⋮ A \(\beta\)-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets ⋮ NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies ⋮ Essential stability of cooperative equilibria for population games ⋮ Some generalizations of Zhao's theorem: hybrid solutions and weak hybrid solutions for games with nonordered preferences ⋮ Oligopolistic markets with leadership, cooperative followers and a multivalued inverse demand function ⋮ An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information
Cites Work
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- Interval orders and circle orders
- Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences
- An equilibrium existence theorem without complete of transitive preferences
- On the non-emptiness of the core of a coalitional production economy without ordered preferences
- Extensions of two fixed point theorems of F. E. Browder
- The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
- A Core Existence Theorem for Games Without Ordered Preferences
- A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
- The Core of an Economy with Production
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