Evolutionarily stable sets in symmetric extensive two-person games

DOI10.1016/0025-5564(92)90055-2zbMath0763.92005OpenAlexW1973758625WikidataQ52425103 ScholiaQ52425103MaRDI QIDQ1183728

Ross Cressman

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Mathematical Biosciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0025-5564(92)90055-2

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategiesevolutionary gamesextensive formpure strategydirect ESSrepeated playdynamic stability of ES setshawk-doveinformational asymmetriesmale desertion gamemixed strategy modelsnormal form of gamesowner-intruder

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Animal behavior (92D50)

Related Items (3)

When will evolution lead to deceptive signaling in the Sir Philip Sidney game? ⋮ Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces ⋮ Robustness against indirect invasions

Cites Work

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• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
• Evolutionarily stable sets in mixed-strategist models
• On evolutionarily stable sets
• Strong stability and evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of players
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Game theory and evolution

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