Uniqueness results and algorithm for Stackelberg-Cournot-Nash equilibria

DOI10.1007/BF02098171zbMath0751.90016MaRDI QIDQ1184518

Roger L. Tobin

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

sensitivity analysisCournot-Nash equilibriumStackelberg firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Hierarchical systems (93A13) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Computational methods for problems pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-08)

Related Items

An interior point technique for solving bilevel programming problems, Competitive crowdfunding under asymmetric quality information, A smoothing Newton method for mathematical programs constrained by parameterized quasi-variational inequalities, On noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader-follower game, Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm, A numerical approach to optimization problems with variational inequality constraints, Sensitivity analysis for a Cournot equilibrium, Homotopy method for solving mathematical programs with bounded box-constrained variational inequalities, On Stackelberg–Nash Equilibria in Bilevel Optimization Games, Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography, Oligopolistic markets with leadership, cooperative followers and a multivalued inverse demand function

Cites Work

• Sensitivity analysis for a Cournot equilibrium
• Sensitivity analysis based heuristic algorithms for mathematical programs with variational inequality constraints
• Equilibrium Decomposed Optimization: A Heuristic for the Continuous Equilibrium Network Design Problem
• On a Direct Algorithm for Nonlinear Complementarity Problems
• Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations