A leader-follower model and analysis for a two-stage network of oligopolies
DOI10.1007/BF02098172zbMath0751.90010MaRDI QIDQ1184520
Joanna M. Leleno, Hanif D. Sherali
Publication date: 28 June 1992
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
existenceuniquenesssensitivity analysescomputation of leader-follower equilibrium solutionsfinal goodsemi-finished producttwo-stage network of oligopolies
Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Production models (90B30) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Hierarchical systems (93A13) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Related Items (4)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Contributions to Cournot oligopoly theory
- Expectations and stability in oligopoly models
- Non-cooperative games
- Finding All n-Firm Cournot Equilibria
- A Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model and Analysis
- A Mathematical Programming Approach to a Nash-Cournot Equilibrium Analysis for a Two-Stage Network of Oligopolies
- The stability of generalised stackelberg equilibria in heterogeneous oligopoly
- Determining Optimal Use of Resources among Regional Producers under Differing Levels of Cooperation
- A mathematical programming approach for determining oligopolistic market equilibrium
- A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium
- The stability of price adjusting oligopoly with conjectural variations
- Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations
This page was built for publication: A leader-follower model and analysis for a two-stage network of oligopolies