Implementing the core of a two-person pure allocation game without free disposal or integer games

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90215-7zbMath0741.90102OpenAlexW2074276163WikidataQ126557525 ScholiaQ126557525MaRDI QIDQ1184750

S. Singh

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90215-7

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriacoretwo-person pure allocation game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation

This page was built for publication: Implementing the core of a two-person pure allocation game without free disposal or integer games