Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence
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Publication:1184840
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(92)90019-4zbMath0751.90015OpenAlexW1493610080MaRDI QIDQ1184840
Joseph M. Ostroy, Louis Makowski
Publication date: 28 June 1992
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(92)90019-4
Related Items (6)
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition ⋮ Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model ⋮ No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game ⋮ Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads ⋮ Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive
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