The welfaristic characterization of two-person revelation equilibria under imputational government

DOI10.1007/BF00177671zbMath0813.90001OpenAlexW2019458899MaRDI QIDQ1184956

Murat R. Sertel, Semih Koray

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00177671

zbMATH Keywords

individually rational outcomesNash equilibria of the revelation game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Social choice (91B14)

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