A note on the core and von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of simple games

DOI10.1007/BF00177672zbMath0756.90101OpenAlexW3122706598MaRDI QIDQ1184957

Shlomo Weber, Michel Le Breton

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00177672

zbMATH Keywords

corevoting gamesimple gamevon Neumann-Morgenstern solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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