Failures of the reduction principle in an Ellsberg-type problem

DOI10.1007/BF00133629zbMath0825.90027MaRDI QIDQ1185736

Michele Bernasconi, Graham Loomes

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16) Individual preferences (91B08) Decision theory for games (91A35) Measurement and performance in psychology (91E45)

Related Items (8)

Comonotonic independence: The critical test between classical and rank- dependent utility theories ⋮ Skewed noise ⋮ An experimental study on the effect of ambiguity in a coordination game ⋮ Negative recency, randomization device choice, and reduction of compound lotteries ⋮ Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity ⋮ Belief updating and the demand for information ⋮ An experimental test of reduction invariance ⋮ Recursive expected utility and the separation of attitudes towards risk and ambiguity: An experimental study

Cites Work

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• Risk aversion in the theory of expected utility with rank dependent probabilities
• Some implications of a more general form of regret theory
• Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity
• Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
• The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
• The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach
• Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk

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