Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90201-UzbMath0742.90095OpenAlexW1988900837MaRDI QIDQ1186869

Karl Wärneryd

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90201-u

zbMATH Keywords

preplay communicationgames of perfectly coinciding interestsinefficient Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Cooperative games (91A12)

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Lotka-Volterra equation and replicator dynamics: New issues in classification ⋮ An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives ⋮ The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria ⋮ On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests ⋮ Communication, risk, and efficiency in games ⋮ Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values ⋮ Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli ⋮ Communication, correlation, and symmetry in bargaining ⋮ Co-evolution of pre-play signaling and cooperation ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games

Cites Work

• Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
• Communication between rational agents
• Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
• Strategic Information Transmission
• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
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