Did Pearson reject the Neyman-Pearson philosophy of statistics!

DOI10.1007/BF00485352zbMath0850.62123MaRDI QIDQ1187226

Deborah G. Mayo

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01)

Related Items (1)

Strategies for securing evidence through model criticism

Cites Work

• The logical foundations of statistical inference
• A note on metastatistics or An essay toward stating a problem in the doctrine of chances
• The Neyman-Pearson theory as decision theory, and as inference theory; with a criticism of the Lindley-Savage argument for Bayesian theory
• Decisions as statistical evidence and Birnbaum's confidence concept
• Bayesian statistics and biased procedures
• On the Foundations of Statistical Inference
• Discussion of 'On the Allocation of Treatments in Sequential Medical Trials' by J.A. Bather and 'The Search for Optimality in Clinical Trials' by P. Armitage
• Some Thoughts on Statistical Inference
• IX. On the problem of the most efficient tests of statistical hypotheses
• METHODS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS APPROPRIATE FOR k SAMPLES OF TWO VARIABLES
• A Refutation of the Neyman-Pearson Theory of Testing
• ON QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE COMBINATION OF TESTS BASED ON DISCONTINUOUS DISTRIBUTIONS
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