Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90005-DzbMath0777.90088MaRDI QIDQ1187865

S. H. Tijs, P. E. M. Borm

Publication date: 3 August 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

strong Nash equilibriastrong corecoordinationAumann procedurestandard NTU-gamestrategic claim game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (7)

Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers ⋮ Monotonic games are spanning network games ⋮ TRANSFORMING GAMES FROM CHARACTERISTIC INTO NORMAL FORM ⋮ A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division ⋮ A note on the Owen set of linear programming games and Nash equilibria ⋮ The consistency principle for games in strategic form ⋮ USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION

Cites Work

• The Bargaining Problem
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
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