Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90006-EzbMath0760.90099OpenAlexW2093840504MaRDI QIDQ1187866

Peter M. DeMarzo

Publication date: 3 August 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90006-e

zbMATH Keywords

sustainable outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Influence functions, followers and command games ⋮ Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games ⋮ The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration

Cites Work

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• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• An application of the theory of social situations to repeated games
• Finitely Repeated Games
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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