The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90007-FzbMath0769.90083MaRDI QIDQ1187867

Charles M. Kahn, Dilip Mookherjee

Publication date: 3 August 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stable setscoalition proof Nash equilibriumequilibria in infinite games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (4)

Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers ⋮ A coalition proof equilibrium for a private information credit economy ⋮ A characterization of path dependent modes of behavior ⋮ Deriving Nash equilibria as the supercore for a relational system

Cites Work

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• Financial intermediary-coalitions
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Deriving strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria from an abstract system
• Sustainable matching plans with adverse selection
• Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games

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