A new characterization of the Groves-Clarke mechanism

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90030-OzbMath0751.90029MaRDI QIDQ1189330

Tomas Sjöström

Publication date: 26 September 1992

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueGroves mechanismGroves-Clarke mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions

Cites Work

• Incentives in Teams
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