Economic implications of imperfect quality certification

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90067-UzbMath0825.90124OpenAlexW2076481507MaRDI QIDQ1189347

Sankar De, Prafulla Nabar

Publication date: 26 September 1992

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90067-u

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (3)

Nonprofit organizations, free media and donor's trust ⋮ Imperfect certification in a Bertrand duopoly ⋮ Test design under voluntary participation

Cites Work

• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Sequential Equilibria

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