Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90073-TzbMath0747.90011OpenAlexW2087802835MaRDI QIDQ1189350

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 26 September 1992

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90073-t

zbMATH Keywords

\(n\)-person collective choice problembudget balancingefficient dominant strategy mechanismquasi-linear utility functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Economics of information (91B44) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information
• On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
• Incentives in Teams

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